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Criminal Law 
Tricl<s 
Prosecutors Play 
C Liminal ddense lawyers must recognize and challenge pros-ecutorial misconduct when-ever it occurs . In my opin-
ion , prosecuto~'s today wiel~i greater 
power, engage In more egregious mIs-
conduct, and are less subject to judicial 
or bar association oversight than ever 
befi)re. Few defense lawyers or commen-
tators would disagree with these con-
clusions. Indeed, some types of pros-
ecutorial misconduct have become al-
most " normative to the system." I 
This is not to say, of course, that pri-
vate attorneys do not engage in similar 
misconduct . They do. There are, how-
ever, important differences between pros-
ecutors and defense attorneys that make 
prosecutorial violations much more 
insidious. 
Prosecutors are generally perceived by 
juric ' as prcstigioLls a.nd honomblc "cha111-
f io ns < f justi(c." The r have powerfu l 
strat 'gic and tinancia l resources tha t 
u 'unll , give them disLinct advanrage. 
over rhciT adversaries. And PI'( , eCll ror. 
operate under higher ethical standards 
than other lawyers-i .e., a special obliga-
tion "to seck justice." 2 Despite or be-
cause of these differences, prosecutorial 
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misconduct is all too often overlooked, 
condoned, or found to be harmless. 3 
Prosecutors function in a variety of 
contexts in the criminal justice system . 
They enjoy vast decision-maki ng powers 
in areas sLlch as charging crimes, plea 
bargaining, granting immunity, sum-
moning witnesses to grand juries, and 
determining sentences. Prosecutorial 
domination over the "awful instruments 
of the/criminal law," to use Justice Felix 
Frankfurter's apt terminology,4 is largely 
uncontrolled by the courts.5 Indeed, 
unfettered prosecutorial discretion may 
be the most terrifying and the most in-
soluble problem in the administration 
of criminal justice. 
That problem, however is bey md the 
sco pe o f this article. Th e ~(]ClI S here is 
on prosccmmial mise ndllC[ :J.t oi. l ha 
results in depriving the defendant f , 
fair nnd rcliable determination f guil t . 
While the incidence of misconduct is 
increasing, judges ' willingness to impose 
remedies such as reversal of convictions 
or dismissal of charges is decreasing. This 
is not an anomaly. There is a direct cor-
relation between this laissez faire judicial 
attitude and the escalation of prosecu-
torial misconduct . 
Just as the threat of penal sanctions 
is thought to deter illegal behavior by 
criminals, the prospect of judicial sanc-
tions such as reversals, dismissals, or 
contempt citations would be expected 
to deter errant behavior by rational 
prosecutors. However, since " winning 
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the war 011 crime" is a major political 
prcoc upatiol1 IOday, [he procedural safe-
guards :lJld prohibitions set up to ensllre 
that de tCndanrs get fa ir trials may be 
seen by some as retarding progress toward 
that goal. 
It is therefore not surprising that to 
affirm convictions despite prosecutorial 
misconduct, appellate courts increasing-
ly invoke a variety of questionable pro-
cedures. These include broadening use 
of harmless-error review, overlooking 
misconduct that was allegedly "invited" 
by defense counsel, ignoring miscon-
duct to which defense counsel failed to 
object, or indulging in the fiction that 
so-called "curative instructions" by the 
IT;''\. judj"Tt: a. ·tuall ), mitigate rhc harm . 
By lh . same taken ace' s t (()lla tcl~l l 
r 'vic\ through th writ of habeas cor-
pus i gradually bcing er ded through 
doctrinal and procedlll'al bars. x:lmpk ' 
of ch c..~c barriel's include exhaustion, 
default, waiver, and the need to show 
prejudice. 
This ;s not to say that trial or appellate 
courts are completely insensitive to pros-
ecutorial excesses. Some trial judges moni-
tor pro eClI rDl'S quite dosd l-particulaJ'~ 
I), rho 'c wi th track rccO!" is o flx:having 
overzealo ll. ly. , 0111' appellate Ol1 rts 
,tLo keep \ atch 0 11 prosecutors. And 
ol11e bar ssoLi. ti n o-ffi 'ials bring dis~ 
ciplinary charges against proseclltors [{)t' 
egregious trial behavior. 
Having said this, I will now turn to 
a discussion of some of the more egrc-
gious "trial tricks" that proseclltors some-
times play. 
Assassinating Defendant's Character 
Attacking a dcfcndant's character makes 
a conviction more likely. The devastat-
Ing impact on a jury of a defendant's 
prior criminal or sordid acts is clear and 
has been empirically proven. 6 Consider 
~he William Kennedy Smith rape trial 
In Florida. Had the prosecution been 
able to place bcfcJre the jury evidence 
that Smith had engaged in three prior 
episodes of sexual misconduct, the ver-
dict might have been different. 
Prosecutors have portrayed defendants 
as dangerous, sinister, and undesirable 
characters who are therefore more likely 
to have committed the crime charged, 
and convictions occasionally are reversed 
because of such misconduct. 7 Attempt-
ing to insinuate that a defendant was 
guilty by showing that he had associated 
with, was related to, or was in the com-
pany of criminals is improper. 8 So is stig-
matizing defendants either directly 
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(through cross-examination)9 or indi-
rectly (through extrinsic proot)10 by in-
timating that the dcfcndant has a crimi-
nal record and therefore is more likely 
to have committed the crime charged. 
Introducing Improper Evidence 
Presenting false, misleading, or inad-
missible evidence is unethical and po-
tentially violates due process. II Examples 
of this practice include using perjured 
testimony l2 and introducing physical or 
other evidence that deceives the jury 
47 
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about a material 6et. 13 It is also unethi-
cal for prosecutors to seck to make a £.1lse 
impression on the jUt)' by loading ques-
tions with innuendos when no support-
ing evidence exists . 14 Suggesting with-
out any factual basis that defendant's 
wife left him because of his drug transac-
tions is an example of such a bad-faith 
question. 15 
Similarly, referring to polygraph tests,16 
withdrawn guilty pleas, 17 or guilty pleas 
of co-conspirators l8 may be an improper 
tactic deliberately designed to distort the 
f.1ct-finding process against the defen-
dant. Forcing a defendant or defense wit-
ness under cross-examination to charac-
terize the testimony of a prosecution 
witness as "lies" is a frequently used 
tactic that invites appellate censure. 19 
Inflaming Juror Prejudice 
Prosecutors know that appeals to the 
jul)"s passions and prejudices, although 
improper, may skew the jury's evalua-
tion of the prooPo toward conviction. 
To that end, prosecutors have displayed 
infiammatOl), and inadmissible physical 
evidence before juries;21 offcred grue-
some and irrelevant photographs of the 
victim;22 elicited inflammatory testi-
mony;23 and injected gratuitous, inflam-
matory rhetoric into the proceedings. 24 
Summation gives the prosecutor a 
unique opportunity to prejudice the de-
fendant. Common examples ofin£1a111-
matory argument include exhorting juries 
to win the war on crime;25 inciting them 
to vengeance;26 using insulting and abu-
sive epithets and invective to describe 
the defendam;2? appealing to racial, eth-
nic, national, or religious prejudice;28 
appealing to wealth and class bias/9 and 
imputing to the defendant violence and 
threats against witnesses. 30 
Violating the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination 
It is improper for a prosecutor to en-
courage the JUI)' to infer guilt from the 
defendant's silence at triaP! or failure to 
explain his conduct to the police after 
arrest. 32 This tactic has been used to im-
peach a defendant's testimony at triaP3 
and to argue that if the defendant was 
innocent, he would have testified, but 
because he has not, he is guilty. 
Appellate reversal is more likely when 
the prosecutor's comments refer directly 
to the defendant's failure to testify. 34 
Prosecutors therefore tL)' to make the 
point more subtly, through oblique ref-
erences to the government's proof being 
"uncontradicted,"35 "unrefuted,"36 or 
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"undenied."3? Although the prosecu-
tor's intent here is clear, such references 
often escape appellate sanction. 
Comments about the defcndant's f.'lil-
ure to call witnesses should also be clOSely 
scrutinized to determine whether they 
involve a prohibited comment on the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 38 
Denigrating Defense Counsel 
Attacks on defense counsel are not 
unusual. By belittling defense counsel , 
prosecutors may believe that they call 
gain an advantage before the jUlY Some 
prosecutors disparage the defense by sug-
gesting that defense counsel's objections 
were made in bad f.1ith . 39 Another tactic 
is to insinuate that defense counsel docs 
not believe the client's testimony or has 
no confidence in the case. 40 
Personal attacks on defense counsel 's 
ethics and integrity are not uncommon. 
Prosecutors have insinuated that defense 
counsel presented "contrived testi-
mony,"41 "f:1bricated a defense,"42 or 
engaged in illegal conduct. 43 
Some jurisdictions allow prosecutors 
to make an opening summation and 
thell a rebuttal summation. Some COUITS 
have recognized a phenomenon known 
as "sandbagging," where the prosecutor 
makes new arguments and raises new 
theories for t11e first time during rebuttal 
summation. 44 Coutts look with disfavor 
on this practice when it unfairly takes 
defense counsel by surprise. 
Exploiting Prosecutorial Prestige 
It is unethical for prosecutors to ma-
nipulate the jury's evaluation of the evi-
dence by stressing their own personal 
integrity and the prestige of their office. 45 
Prosecutors disregard this rule when they 
try to enhance a witness's credibility by 
expressing their own faith in the wit-
ness 's truthfulness46 or the defendant's 
guiltY This personal vouching makes 
the prosecutor an unsworn witness. 
Insinuating that information outside 
the record verifies the witness's truthfld-
ness is another form of improper vouch-
ing. 48 So is suggesting that cooperation 
agreements with witnesses show that the 
prosecutor knows what the truth is and 
that by entering into such an agreement 
with the witness, the prosecutor is en-
suring that the truth will be revealed . 49 
Misrepresenting the Record 
It is improper for prosecutors to reter 
to matters outside the record;50 to point 
to exhibits or testimony that have not 
been entered into evidence, implying 
f 
II 
6 
a 
It 
51 
t1lC)' are incriminating;51 to misrepresent 
[he record;52 or to insinuate that issues 
ortact have already been decided. 53 Pros-
ccutors have also been rebuked filr going 
outside the record and commenting on 
the consequCllces that might result from 
the jury's verdict. 54 These comments are 
intended to lessen the jurors' sense of 
Icsponsibility and recognition ofthe se-
riousness of their verdict. Impermissible 
rGJ11arks include references to the possi-
bility of mitigation of punishment by 
the judge,55 the availability of pardon or 
executive clemency, 56 and the availabili-
ty of appellate review. 57 
finding Remedies 
Sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct 
~lre infrequent . Appellate reversal is seen 
as too costly to society. 58 Judge Learned 
Hand 's argument is endorsed by most 
courts. Referring to a proseclltor's mis-
conduct, Judge Hand wrote, "That was 
plainly an improper remark, and if re-
versal would do more than show our 
disapproval, we might reverse. Unhappily, 
it would accomplish little towards punish-
ing the offender, and would upset the 
conviction of a plainly guilt), man .... 
It seems to us that reversal would be an 
immoderate penalty."59 
Civil damage actions against prosecu-
tors are usually unsuccessful because of 
the doctrine of proseclltorial immuni-
ty.60 Contempt sanctions are rarely em-
ployed,61 and professional discipline is 
cven more rarely utilized. 62 
In such a climate of opinion, effective-
ly chaUenging prosecutorial misconduct 
at the trial level becomes more impor-
t:\I1t aU the time. It requires, first, a thor-
ough understanding of the substantive 
rules governing the parameters of pros-
ecutorial behavior; second, an alertness 
tu conduct that violates those rules; and 
third, the ability to make a record through 
til11ely objection or by other means. 
Valid claims are frequently lost through 
the failure of trial counsel to register a 
timely protest. 
Knowing from the outset that pros-
eClltorial misconduct ma)' occur allows 
defense counsel to make an advance mo-
tion such as a motion in limine to pre-
vent such misconduct before it occurs. 
These motions have been made when 
defense counsc! knows that a particular 
prosecutor has a track record of engag-
Illg in specific types of misbehavior-
for example, asking questions without 
~ny evidentiary foundation , eliciting 
llladmissible and inflammatoty evidence 
SUch as prior bad acts by the defendant, 
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nr using part icu larly inJhmm, tory lan-
guage in argllmen t ro [he jllry. 
Mrlny defensc I n\vycl~~ un: r +lIct:mr to 
ant;lgo ll~,(; pn SCClIt )I'S with whom rhey 
have to de:1.1 O il a rcgular basis, However, 
making a f(mnal complaint with a state 
or local bar association or with thc U.S, 
I Cp;lrll11Cnr of J lIsti«~'s Office of Pro-
bsional Responsibi lity may be not only 
all apprupriate rind cni:ctivc J'CCOllI-:,;e, 
hut rhe besr when prosc utoria l 1111S-
conduct ocellI 0 
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